In reviewing British citizen’s liability for extradition to U.S. on fraud charges of concealing antitrust violations, U.K. Supreme Court decides that Article 8 of European Convention on Human Rights requiring evaluation of its impact on disruption of Applicant’s family life did not apply to preclude rendition of Applicant to U.S. for trial


In reviewing British citizen’s liability for extradition to U.S. on fraud charges of concealing antitrust violations, U.K. Supreme Court decides that Article 8 of European Convention on Human Rights requiring evaluation of its impact on disruption of Applicant’s family life did not apply to preclude rendition of Applicant to U.S. for trial
In 2004, the United States government asked the United Kingdom to extradite Ian Norris (Respondent), a British citizen, to stand trial on a federal grand jury indictment containing four counts. Respondent is a former CEO of a prominent international maker of carbon products.
The first charge was that the Respondent had conspired with other producers of carbon products to run a price fixing agreement or cartel in several countries including the United States. Counts 2 to 4 alleged a conspiracy to obstruct justice by tampering with witnesses and by causing a person to alter, destroy, mutilate or conceal various documents with intent to make them unavailable for use in an official proceeding.
The following year, British authorities arrested the Respondent in England and the U.S. filed extradition proceedings in the Court of Queen’s Bench (QB). The QB held that the offenses described in the extradition request constituted extraditable crimes for the purposes of the treaty between the U.S. and the U.K. [see Extradition Treaty Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, U.S.‑U.K, Mar. 31, 2003, S. TREATY DOC. NO, 108‑23; as amended Dec. 16, 2004; in force April 26, 2007]. Respondent appealed.
The main issues raised by his appeal relate to the proper approach that the English courts should take where Respondent contends that extradition will interfere with his rights to respect for his private and family life under Article 8 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms [312 U.N.T.S. 221; E.T.S. 5; plus modifying Protocols]; from Barry E. Carter, 2010 Selected Documents of International Law at 512 [Convention].


Article 8 provides that: “1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence. 2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well‑being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.”
The QB dismissed the Respondent’s appeal against that decision. A panel of the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom, however, granted leave to appeal to the full Court. It agreed that the price‑fixing conduct would not, if committed in England and Wales at the relevant time, have constituted an offense known to English law and so was not capable of constituting an extraditable offence. The Supreme Court remitted the determination of the remaining issues raised by Respondent back to the lower court.
At that hearing, Respondent contended that the ill‑health of both him and his wife, who were then aged 65 and 64 respectively, their mutual dependency based on a long and close marriage, and the effect that his extradition would have on his wife’s depressive illness, made the interference with their family rights under Article 8 of the Convention disproportionate to the public interest in his extradition for charges subsidiary to the main cartel charge.
The QB rejected that submission and, pursuant to the 2003 Extradition Act, sent the case to the Home Secretary, who ordered the Respondent’s extradition. The Divisional Court dismissed the Respondent’s appeal against those decisions. The case again came before the full Supreme Court. That Court again dismisses Respondent’s appeal.
The Court held that there could be no absolute rule that any interference with Article 8 rights as a result of extradition would be enough. There was a compelling public interest in extradition as part of the process for ensuring the prevention of disorder and crime. Since the probability of some degree of interference with family life was inherent in the process of international extradition, the results of this interference with those rights had to be highly serious before they could outweigh the public interest in giving effect to requests for extradition. It would have to make the extradition of the individual disproportionate. When considering the proportionality of a particular extradition, the judge could take into account the relative gravity of the offense and the effect of extradition on members of the extraditee’s family.
The charges of obstructing justice were of themselves offenses of major gravity. Moreover, the effects of extradition on the Respondent’s close family ties [the severity of which had increased by reason of the delay brought about by his asserting his legal rights in regard to the price‑fixing charge,] were not so excessive as to render that extradition out of proportion to the public interest in crime prevention. Accordingly, the U.K. Supreme Court dismisses Respondent’s appeal.
[The following are selected passages from the Court’s thorough lead opinion by Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers PSC with which all members of the Court concurred].


“The Extradition Act of 2003 created a new extradition regime intended to simplify the process. The new regime transferred considerations that were formerly for the discretion of the Secretary of State to the courts; these include the compatibility of a particular extradition with Convention rights. ...”
“The Act defines the eligible territories. Category 1 consists of members of the European Union which operate the European Arrest Warrant. Category 2 territories are those designated by the U.K. Secretary of State. ...The United States is one of these.”
“Under both procedures, the appropriate judge has to carry out an extradition hearing at which he considers whether there exists any of the prescribed statutory bars to extradition. [such as] compatibility with Convention rights. If yes, an order for extradition must follow. If no, the person must be discharged. General provision is made in both for circumstances that may well involve interferences with Convention rights.”
“Public international law does not impose a general duty upon countries to accede to requests for extradition. Obligations to extradite arise out of bilateral treaties. [See above] None the less, a number of Conventions have been concluded that impose on states an obligation to extradite or prosecute in respect of certain offences or which limit the grounds upon which a state can refuse to extradite. These reflect increasing international cooperation in the fight against crime.” [576].
“The relevant [bilateral] treaty in the present case is the Extradition Treaty of 1972 (Cmnd 6723) between the United Kingdom and the United States. [T]his applies in the case of any extradition proceedings in which the extradition documents were submitted before 26 April 2007. On that date a new treaty, the Extradition Treaty of 2003 (Cm 5821) came into force. The extradition documents in this case were submitted in January 2005.”
“The 1972 Treaty imposes, subject to specified exceptions, mutual obligations to extradite in respect of offences which carry a sentence of at least 12 months’ imprisonment in each jurisdiction. Article V(2) of the 1972 Treaty provides that extradition may be refused on any ground which is specified by the law of the requested party. Thus the United Kingdom will not be in breach of its treaty obligations if, by reason of the 2003 Act, extradition is refused on human rights grounds.”
“Between the contending parties, ‘[t]he following matters are common ground: (I) In this case, as in most extradition cases, extradition of [Respondent] from this country will interfere [to some extent] with his exercise in this country of his right to respect for his private and family life. (ii) This interference will be in accordance with the law. (iii) The critical issue in this case is whether this interference is ‘necessary in a democratic society for the prevention of disorder or crime’. (iv) Resolving this issue involves a test of proportionality. The interference must fulfill a ‘pressing social need’. It must also be proportionate to the ‘legitimate aim’ relied upon to justify the interference.”
“The Government contends that the legitimate aim, or pressing social need, is the honouring of extradition arrangements (an important aspect of the prevention of [international] crime), that this aim weighs heavily in the scales and that the circumstances in which interference with Article 8 rights will not be proportionate to it will be exceptional.”


“[Counsel] for Respondent does not challenge this assertion. He accepts that it will only be in exceptional circumstances that extradition will be refused on the ground that it involves a disproportionate interference with Article 8 rights. He submits, however, that this fact cannot be translated into a legal principle. The court cannot impose on a person challenging extradition a threshold requirement of demonstrating that his case is exceptional. He submits that this is what the Divisional Court did. “ [577].
“The primary issue of principle is whether the court can properly require a person resisting extradition on Article 8 grounds to demonstrate exceptional circumstances. Respondent contends that the Divisional Court erred in doing just this. His argument is precisely expressed in the following two paragraphs of his written case:”
“Hence the question which they certified as being of general public importance: is the public interest in honouring extradition treaties such as to require, in any extradition case, that an appellant must show striking and unusual facts or reach a high threshold if his Article 8 claim is to succeed The effect is to create a strong presumption against the application of Article 8 in extradition cases, and to require exceptional circumstances before any objection to extradition on Article 8 grounds can succeed, a proposition which has been rejected by the House of Lords, following a substantial body of case law in the European Court of Human Rights [ECHR].”       “In cases of this type, [t]he correct approach is to balance the public interest in the extradition of this particular accused against the damage which would be done to the private or family life of this particular accused and his family. The court must ask how much damage will really be done to the orderly functioning of the system of extradition, or the prevention of disorder or crime, by declining to extradite Respondent in this case. And whether that damage is so great as to outweigh the devastating impact that extradition would have upon the rest of his and his wife’s life together. These questions must, moreover, be answered with an eye to the fact that the test imposed by Article 8(2) is not whether his extradition is on balance desirable, but whether it is necessary in a democratic society.
“A number of subsidiary issues of principle in relation to the application of the test of proportionality in an extradition case became apparent in the course of argument.” [590].
“I agree that there can be no absolute rule that any interference with Article 8 rights as a consequence of extradition will be proportionate. The public interest in extradition none the less weighs very heavily indeed. In Wellington [2009] AC 335, the majority of the House of Lords held that the public interest in extradition carries special weight where Article 3 is engaged in a foreign case. I am in no doubt that the same is true when considering the interference that extradition will cause in a domestic case to Article 8 rights enjoyed within the jurisdiction of the requested state. It is certainly not right to equate extradition with expulsion or deportation in this context.”


“It is of critical importance in the prevention of disorder and crime that those reasonably suspected of crime are prosecuted and, if found guilty, duly sentenced. Extradition is part of the process for ensuring that this occurs, on a basis of international reciprocity. It is instructive to consider the approach of the Convention to dealing with criminals or suspected criminals in the domestic context. Article 5 includes in the exceptions to the right to liberty (I) the arrest of a suspect, (ii) his detention, where necessary, pending trial, and (iii) his detention while serving his sentence if convicted.”
“Such detention will necessarily interfere drastically with family and private life. In theory a question of proportionality could arise under [Convention] Article 8(2) . In practice, it is only in the most exceptional circumstances that a defendant would consider even asserting his Article 8 rights by way of challenge to remand in custody or imprisonment: Normally it is treated as axiomatic that the interference with Article 8 rights consequent upon detention is proportionate.”
The Court recalls that Article 8(2) permits interference with an individual’s right to respect for his private and family life in certain circumstances. The Court considers that the bringing of criminal proceedings and the imposition of a punishment following conviction fall within these exceptions since they are in accordance with the law and pursue legitimate aims, namely, public safety, the prevention of disorder and crime and protection of the rights and freedoms of others. The court therefore concludes that the prosecution and imprisonment of the Applicant does not raise any issues under Article 8 of the Convention.
“There is an analogy between the coercion involved in extradition and the coercion involved in remanding in custody a prisoner reasonably suspected of wishing to abscond. In either case the coercion is necessary to ensure that the suspect stands his trial. Each is likely to involve a serious interference with Article 8 rights. The dislocation of family life that will frequently follow extradition will not necessarily be more significant, or even as significant, as the dislocation of family life of the defendant who is remanded in custody.”
“It seems to me that, until recently, it has also been treated as axiomatic that the dislocation to family life that normally follows extradition as a matter of course is proportionate. This perhaps explains why we have been referred to no reported case, whether at Strasbourg or in this jurisdiction, where extradition has been refused because of the interference that it would cause to family life.”
“The reality is that only if some quite exceptionally compelling feature, or combination of features, is present that interference with family life consequent upon extradition will be other than proportionate to the objective that extradition serves. That, no doubt, is what the commission had in mind ... when it stated that it was only in exceptional circumstances that extradition would be an unjustified or disproportionate interference with the right to respect for family life. I can see no reason why the district judge should not, when considering a challenge to extradition founded on Article 8 , explain his rejection of such a challenge, where appropriate, by remarking that there was nothing out of the ordinary or exceptional in the consequences that extradition would have for the family life of the person resisting extradition.”


’Exceptional circumstances’ is a phrase that says little about the nature of the circumstances. Instead of saying that interference with Article 8 rights can only outweigh the importance of extradition in exceptional circumstances. it is more accurate and more helpful, to say that the consequences of interference with Article 8 rights must be exceptionally serious before this can outweigh the importance of extradition. A judge should not be criticised if, as part of his process of reasoning, he considers how, if at all, the nature and extent of the impact of extradition on family life would differ from the normal consequences of extradition.”
“After considering the Strasbourg jurisprudence, the House [of Lords] concluded that, when considering interference with Article 8, the family unit had to be considered as a whole, and each family member had to be regarded as a victim. I consider that this is equally the position in the context of extradition.”
“Indeed, in trying to envisage a situation in which interference with Article 8 might prevent extradition, I have concluded that the effect of extradition on innocent members of the extraditee’s family might well be a particularly cogent consideration. If extradition for an offence of no great gravity were sought in relation to someone who had sole responsibility for an incapacitated family member, this combination of circumstances might well lead a judge to discharge the extraditee under ... the 2003 Act.”
“Extradition proceedings should not become the occasion for a debate about the most convenient forum for criminal proceedings. Rarely, if ever, on an issue of proportionality, could the possibility of bringing criminal proceedings in this jurisdiction be capable of tipping the scales against extradition in accordance with this country’s treaty obligations. Unless the judge reaches the conclusion that the scales are finely balanced, he should not enter into an inquiry as to the possibility of prosecution in this country.”
“Human rights are in issue and it is for this court to reach its own decision as to whether Applicant’s extradition would be compatible with his article 8 rights.” [594].
“... The gravamen of the case of obstructing justice appears in the following passages of the judgment ... in the earlier proceedings—based on a deposition of Lucy P. McClain, a trial attorney for the antitrust division of the U.S. Department of Justice:”
“‘[Applicant] instructed, through a task force he set up for the purpose, all Morgan entities involved in the price fixing conspiracy to remove, conceal or destroy any documentary material, in particular Morgan’s sales files in Europe, evidencing Morgan’s involvement in the conspiracy. He also instructed the retention and concealment of certain documents to enable Morgan to continue monitoring the working of the conspiracy.”
“‘In about November 1999, [Applicant] met several of the co‑conspirators in England to discuss the United States authorities’ investigation into their conspiratorial dealings and meetings, and to devise a false explanation, other than price fixing, to be put to the authorities for the meetings. As Ms. McClain put it in her affidavit: [Applicant] and his subordinates discussed ways in which they could conceal the true purpose of the price‑fixing meetings when asked about them. They decided to falsely characterise their meetings with competitors as discussions of legitimate joint ventures rather than disclose the fact that they were price fixing meetings.’”
“‘[Applicant] expressed his concern that the United States investigators would not believe Morgan’s false explanation that the meetings were held to discuss joint ventures, in part because Morgan had no contemporaneous notes of the meetings to support its joint venture explanation. [Applicant] then directed his subordinates to create false summaries of the price fixing meetings that they would use as a guide or script in answering any future questions about what had occurred at their meetings. ” In view of this showing, all members of this Court agree that it should dismiss the appeal
The courts below also considered whether it was pertinent in cases of this kind to take into account the feasibility of prosecuting Applicant for his U.S. violations in the courts of the United Kingdom. This prompted this brief judicial note. “Per curiam. Rarely, if ever, on an issue of proportionality, could the possibility of bringing criminal proceedings in the United Kingdom be capable of tipping the scales against extradition in accordance with its treaty obligations. Unless the judge reaches the conclusion that the scales are finely balanced, he should not enter into an inquiry as to the possibility of prosecution in the United Kingdom.”
Citation: Norris v. United States, [2010] U.K.S.C. 9; [2010] 2 W.L.R. 572 (2010).
 



**** Patrick Michael Megaro is a partner at Halscott Megaro PA. His primary areas of practice are criminal defense, criminal appeals, post-conviction relief, civil appeals, and civil rights litigation. Attorney Profile at: https://solomonlawguild.com/patrick-michael-megaro; Attorney News at: https://attorneygazette.com/patrick-megaro%2C-esq#ab17a387-a757-4c0f-bc37-81f556fd15ea

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