In case of racketeering enterprise with activities in
both U.S. and Mexico, Seventh Circuit rules that 18 U.S.C. § 1959 that deals
with violent crimes in aid of racketeering activity applies extraterritorially
to murder that occurred in Mexico
Julio Lejia‑Sanchez (Defendant) was the purported leader of
a criminal organization in Mexico that produced fraudulent driver's licenses,
social security cards, permanent residence cards, and other government‑issued
documents. According to the indictment, Defendant's organization smuggled many
of its employees and customers into the U.S. from Mexico.
At issue in this case is Defendant's motion to dismiss Count
III of the indictment; it charged that Defendant had violated 18 U.S.C. 1959
dealing with violent crimes in aid of racketeering activity by arranging for
the murder in Mexico of one of his former employees named Guillermo Jimenez
Flores. The district court dismissed Count III, ruling that § 1959 does not
apply extraterritorially. The United States duly appealed and the Seventh
Circuit reverses.
The United States argued that criminal statutes apply to
criminal actions even if some part is conducted abroad, relying on United
States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94 (1922). The district court, however, had
apparently relied on EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244 (1991) and
other decisions that established a presumption that civil statutes do not apply
to activity outside the United States.
In the Court's view: "Civil decisions such as Aramco
cannot implicitly overrule a decision holding that criminal statutes are
applied differently. The main reason for requiring a clear legislative decision
before applying a civil statute to activity outside our borders is that nations
often differ with respect to [what constitutes] acceptable [non‑criminal]
conduct. See Aramco, supra at 248. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
the statute at issue in Aramco, forbids religious discrimination, but other
nations may impose religious tests. [...]"
"Nations differ in the way they treat the role of
religion in employment; they do not differ to the same extent in the way they
treat murder. They may use different approaches to defenses, burdens of proof
and persuasion, the role of premeditation, and punishment, but none of these is
at stake here. It is not as if murder were forbidden by U.S. law but required
(or even tolerated) by Mexican law. The crime in Bowman was fraud; the Court
observed that fraud was unlawful in all of the places where Bowman's scheme was
implemented."
"Whether or not Aramco and other post‑1922 decisions
are in tension with Bowman, we must apply Bowman until the Justices themselves
overrule it. [‘If a precedent of this Court has direct application in a case,
yet appears to rest on reasons rejected in some other line of decisions, the
Court of Appeals should follow the case which directly controls, leaving to
this Court the prerogative of overruling its own decisions.' Rodriguez de
Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484 ... (1989).] ...
The Supreme Court has neither overruled Bowman nor suggested that the courts of
appeals are free to reconsider its conclusion." [798‑799]
"The Court also clarifies that Bowman does not require
statutes to always apply extraterritorially. Instead, courts must consider
whether the language and function of the statute so require. See Restatement
(Third) of Foreign Relations Law, Section 402(1) (U.S. may apply its law to
conduct that either takes place ‘in substantial part' within the U.S. or has a
‘substantial effect' in the U.S."
"Any international repercussions of the decision to
prosecute [Defendant] are for the political branches to resolve with their
counterparts in Mexico, rather than matters for the judicial branch. That
diplomacy has occurred already. [Defendant] fled to Mexico, which extradited him
to the United States to face all of the indictment's charges. The United States
promised not to seek or impose the death penalty for the murder; Mexico was
satisfied with that undertaking and saw no reason why the United States should
not apply its substantive rules."
"Given the holding of United States v. Alvarez‑Machain,
504 U.S. 655 ¼
(1992), that prosecution in the United States is permissible even if the
defendant arrives [here] by kidnapping rather than formal extradition, this
prosecution is easy to support. The substantive offense in Alvarez‑Machain was
the murder in Mexico, by a Mexican national, of two persons who were helping to
enforce U.S. drug laws; the statute said to be violated in Alvarez‑Machain was
§ 1959, because the murders helped an international drug ring continue in
business."
"The Supreme Court was not asked to hold in Alvarez‑Machain
that applying § 1959 in this fashion would have been impermissibly
extraterritorial, so its decision is not direct authority. But we conclude that
what the parties assumed in Alvarez‑Machain that § 1959 applies to a murder in
another nation designed to facilitate the operation of a criminal enterprise in
the United States is indeed the law." [602 F.3d 801‑802].
Citation: United States v. Leija‑Sanchez, 602 F.3d
797 (7th Cir. 2010).
**** Patrick Michael Megaro is a partner at Halscott Megaro PA. His primary areas of practice are criminal defense, criminal appeals, post-conviction relief, civil appeals, and civil rights litigation. Attorney Profile at: https://solomonlawguild.com/patrick-michael-megaro; Attorney News at: https://attorneygazette.com/patrick-megaro%2C-esq#ab17a387-a757-4c0f-bc37-81f556fd15ea
